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Abstract
While considering the current

legal frameworks adopted by the regional and

international anti-corruption conventions this article aims to show (1) that the lack of a
unified approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful
way, (2) that regulation is unlikely to be efficient results unless there are robust
enforcement mechanisms in place, and (3) that anti-corruption legislation provides only
a partial answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialization.
Part 2 (How Widespread is Corruption?) critically assesses the methodology adopted by
Transparency International (TI) for compiling its perception index. Part 3 (Regulatory
Measures: The Conventions) examines the current frameworks adopted by the existing
conventions to tackle corruption. Part 4 (Enforcement and Informers) highlights the
difficulties associated in enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated
qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing enforcement deficit. Part 5
(Fighting Corruption Through Re-Socialization) asks whether greater social awareness
through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of
society the view is

put forward that

part of the answer for effectively tackling

corruption lies in making people aware of its long-term effects.
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1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s world attention1 has been drawn to the problem of corruption and
much has been said and written about the links between corruption and poverty.2 As a
result regional and international institutions have been hyperactive in drafting and
adopting legislation to combat corruption. We now have eight regional and international
conventions. Not all are in force.
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While it would be logical to expect that these

conventions have adopted a harmonized approach to combating corruption, the scope of
these legal instruments vary and conventions drafted more recently have taken an
increasing robustness in their comprehensiveness by creating offences that may be
arguably questioned for their disregard of due process.4
This article examines the current legal frameworks adopted by the conventions,
regional and international, with the aim of showing (1)

that the lack of a unified

approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful way, (2)
that regulation is unlikely to be efficient results unless there are robust enforcement

1

Civil society organisations, Transparency International (TI) amongst them, have done much to draw
world-wide attention to this menace. Since the mid 1990s, TI has been publicising the incidence of
corruption in countries through its now well established, and widely known and cited corruption index.
The list of countries in their index has increased steadily and includes countries, developed and developing.
These statistics are published by TI on an annual basis. The corruption indices from 1995 onwards are
available on their website http://www.transparency.org
2
See Alatas, S Corruption, Its Nature, Causes and Functions (1990) Aldershot: Brookfield, Bergstein &
Elliott K (eds) Corruption in the World Economy 1997 Washington: Institute for International Economics;
Mbaku ‘Africa after More than Thirty Years of Independence: Still Poor and Deprived” 1994 (11) Journal
of Third World Studies 13, Askin, S & Collins, C ‘External Collusion with Kleptocracy: Can Zaire
Recapture its Stolen Wealth?’ 1993 (53) Review of African Political Economy, Gould D & Mukendi
‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Remedies’ 1989 (12) International Journal
of Public Administration 427; Guhan S & Paul S (eds) Corruption in India: An Agenda for Action (1997)
New Delhi: Vision Books; Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor Cmnd
5006 (2000) London: HMSO; Rose-Ackermann S ‘The Economics of Corruption’ (1975) 4 Journal of
Public Economics 187; Dudley ‘The Rotten Mango: The Effect of Corruption on International
Development Project’ available at http://www.user.gwdg.de , Lambsdorff ‘How Corruption affects Public
Welfare’ (2001) Discussion Paper 9, Center for Globalisation and Europeanisation, University of
Goettingen. Gray, C W & Kaufmann, D ‘Corruption and Development’ in 1998 (35) Finance and
Development 7, Tanzi, V ‘Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’ 1998
(45) IMF Staff Papers 559Corruption may also have something positive to contribute. For instance, in a
highly bureaucratic state corruption may speed up the mechanism for economic development. On the
positive aspects of corruption see Heidenheimer, Johnston M & Le Vine V (Eds) Political Corruption: A
Handbook (1989) London: Transaction Publishers.
3 See ‘Regulatory Measures’ below.
4 See Carr I ‘Corruption in Africa – Is the African Union Convention on Combating Corruption the
Answer?’ forthcoming Journal of Business Law.
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mechanisms in place, and (3) that anti-corruption legislation provides only a partial
answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialization. Part 2
(How Widespread is Corruption?) critically assesses the methodology adopted by
Transparency International (TI) for compiling its perception index. Part 3 (Regulatory
Measures: The Conventions) examines the current frameworks adopted by the existing
conventions to tackle corruption. Part 4 (Enforcement and Informers) highlights the
difficulties associated in enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated
qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing enforcement deficit. Part 5
(Fighting Corruption Through Re-Socialization) asks whether greater social awareness
through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of
society I put forward the view that part of the answer in tackling corruption lies in
making people aware of its long-term effects.
Before proceeding with the task at hand I wish to dispel some commonly held
beliefs in respect of corruption. It must not be surmised from the close relationship
between corruption and poverty that it is exclusively a developing country problem. It
occurs in developed countries,5 the recent scandal in Britain surrounding the Labour
Party peerages for loans6 being one possible such illustration. Recently, the TI has also
published a bribery index which shows that many of the commercial interests from
developed countries are engaged in bribing public officials in developing countries.7
These cases of bribery occur in the context of public procurement contracts, licensing and
foreign direct investment8 thus reinforcing the opinion of policymakers and think tanks
5

Doig, A Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (1984) Harmondsworth: Penguin.
6 See The Independent May 17, 2006, The Daily Telegraph July 16, 2006.
7 There is also evidence of this from the various prosecutions in countries such as the US that companies
through their employees or agents engage in the bribing of foreign public officials. See e.g. SEC v Triton
Energy Corp Fed Sec l Rep (CCH) P 74, 405 (DDC Feb 27, 1997); ICC Case no 6401 (199.1991)
Westinghouse and Burns & Roe (USA) v National Power Company and the Republic of the Philippines;
see also Scherer, M ‘Circumstantial Evidence in Corruption Cases Before Arbitral Tribunals’ 2002 (5:2)
International Arbitration Law Review 29; Kimberly A E (ed) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997)
Washington DC, The Institute for International Economics; Wei S J How Taxing is Corruption on
International Investors NBER Working Paper 6030 (1997) National Bureau of Economic Research; Wei S
J Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance or Major Obstacle? Policy
Research Working Paper 2048 (1999) Washington DC: The World Bank.
8 See Hartman, M ‘Government by Thieves: Revealing the Monsters behind the Kleptocratic Masks’ 1997
(24) Syracuse Journal of International law and Commerce 157; Jun D J ‘Bribery among the Korean Elite:
Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor’ 1996 (29) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law 1071; Lajcakova, J ‘Violation of Human Rights through State Tolerance of Street-Level Bribery: Case
Study: Slovakia’ 2003 (9) Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 111; Ferreiro, A ‘Corruption, Transparency
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from developing countries that developed countries are equally to blame for their
contribution to grand corruption in their countries.9 Evidence also indicates that affluent
developed countries are equally prone to corruption at the petty level as the recent
scandal surrounding possible corruption amongst prison personnel10 suggests.
Neither is corruption a by-product of ruthless capitalism, which promotes selfinterest and maximum economic growth as opposed to the interests of the community.
While it is true that in a competitive global market, where countries such as China and
India offer lucrative returns as a result of cheap labour and lax environmental and labour
standards, bribes play a role in getting a foothold, it is by no means a product of
capitalism. Corruption was found equally in the bureaucracies of non-capitalist countries
such as the USSR.11 It seems to be a universal disease found in all societies regardless of
the political, social, religious and economic background.
In addressing corruption, the importance of the motivations and reasons for
corrupt behaviour cannot be overstated. An understanding of the underlying reasons will
help towards the creation and adoption of a suitable remedial strategy that might require a
conscious, energetic and persistent effort in imparting information at the ground level
about the detrimental effects of corruption thus empowering citizens to adopt suitable
measures to curb corruption. A noticeable aspect of many of the studies on corruption is
that they fail to take into account human nature which has as much to contribute to
corruption as socio-economic conditions.
2. How Widespread is Corruption?

and Political Financing: Some Reflections on the Experience in Chile’ 2004 (10) Southwestern Journal of
Law and Trade in the Americas 345.
9
The belief that the private sector is also to be blamed for corruption is also acknowledged by the Center
for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the US Chamber of Commerce. According to them
“NGOs and civil society organisations alone can’t reduce corruption – business participation is the key to
success. The stakes for the business sector are high – if businesses chose to remain on the sidelines and
continue to participate in corruption they face missing opportunities for foreign investment.” Center for
International Private Enterprise Economic Reform Issue Paper No 0409 September 22, 2004. Available at
http://www.cipe.org .
10
See ‘Main Jail Staff Corrupt – Report’ July 31, 2006 available http://news.bbc.co.uk.
11 See Simis, K USSR: The Corrupt Society (1982) New York: Simon Schuster. Russia continues to be a
highly corrupt society and President Putin has launched a high profile anti-corruption drive which has seen
the removal of a number of high level officials in departments such as customs, internal affairs ministry and
federal security services. See 2006 (58:20) The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 1.
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Anecdotal evidence from businessmen and tales of morally questionable behaviour on the
part of public servants by visitors to and from third world countries normally go a long
way in forming the impression that corruption is a highly visible phenomenon in many of
the developing and least developed countries. Indeed in some countries it is said to be
systemic and so embedded culturally that to try to root out corruption is seen as an
impossible task. To conclude from such anecdotal evidence that corruption is common
place in developing countries is methodologically suspect since it lacks objectivity. A
better alternative may be to examine a country’s crime statistics, number of complaints
and prosecutions12 for corruption and corruption related offences. This method also has
its flaws. It is reliant on a number of assumptions. Among these:
•

that there is a culture of complaint/disclosure of fraud,

•

that there is legislation criminalising various forms of corrupt behaviour such as
bribes and trading in influence,

•

that corruption and corruption related offences are listed separately13 and not
subsumed under other offences such as fraud, embezzlement or extortion,

•

that there is an effective investigation and prosecutorial system that is trusted by
the citizens,

•

that there is easy access to justice,

•

that the country maintains an efficient database of complaints, prosecutions and
convictions, and

•

that the statistics are reliable and publicly available.

Unfortunately, many countries do not have corruption specific legislation though this
is changing due to the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and other regional institutions such as
the African Union (AU) and the South African Development Community (SADC).
12 According to Lambsdorff “the number of prosecutions reflects only the quality of the prosecutors”. (The
Methodology of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index available at http://www.transparency.org )
‘Quality’ is a value laden term and it is unclear whether for instance it refers to the truth seeking aspects
and thoroughness of the prosecutors or whether it refers to a willingness to prosecute readily any allegation
of corruption. I do however agree that prosecution of itself is insufficient to gauge the actual levels of
corruption in a country since many cases of corruption may not reach the prosecution stage.
13 The Indian National Crime Records Bureau records cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act
separately. Figures available at http://www.ncrb.nic.in .
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Equally crime statistics are gathered (sometimes sporadically)14 by home affairs
directorates and police commissions but these are not made publicly available thus
making it difficult to assess the true extent of the problem. In some countries underreporting is acute due to lack of trust in the police.

This is true of many of the

developing countries.15
Even if a jurisdiction meets the criteria listed above prosecution figures may only
convey

part of the story since many instances of corrupt behaviour may not be

prosecuted due to lack of evidence or may go unreported for a number of reasons such
as:
•

fear of reprisals from the recipient of the bribe,

•

apathy,

•

ignorance of legal rights,

•

lack of access to justice,

•

lack of trust in the police,

•

lack of transparency in the judicial system, and

•

fear of involvement in a long drawn out process.

Facts and figures while imparting objectivity at present provides only a partial
picture and it would be illogical to conclude from these that corruption is an endemic
problem globally. This inevitably raises some interesting questions in respect of the TI
index on which we have come to place so much reliance. Among the questions are those
in respect of methodology and reliability.
Based on perceptions, the TI draws upon a number of sources, private, nongovernmental organisations and international institutions. Their selection is guided by
various criteria that seems to seek some level of uniformity of methodology amongst the
sources selected. Whether the sources provide a ranking of countries, and whether they
measure the overall extent of corruption without mixing it with issues such as political
instability are some of the criteria that influence the choice of sources.16 For the 2005
14 For instance, Lesotho, Namibia and Malawi.
15 See Strategic Programme Framework on Crime and Drugs for Southern Africa (2003) Vienna: United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Crime and Development in Africa (2005) Vienna: United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime.
16 See Lambsdorff The Methodology of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. The TI Steering
Committee influences the choices.

6

index the TI drew data from surveys produced by the Center for International Earth
Science Information Network (CIESIN),17 the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU),

18

Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH),19 Information International (II),20 International
Institute for Management Development (IMD), 21 Merchant International Group (MIG),
22

Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, (PERC),

Commission for Africa (UNECA),

24

23

United Nations Economic

the World Economic Forum (WEF),

World Markets Research Centre (WMRC).

26

25

and the

It must however be pointed out that the

level of uniformity achieved through the selection criteria is not influenced by aspects of
the data gathering process. There are noticeable variations between the sources in terms
of those surveyed, the number of countries covered and the questions asked. Taking the
constituency used for the purposes of conducting the surveys, the IMD relies on
businesspeople, UNECA on a local expert panel, PERC on expatriate business executives
while

CIESIN relies on

US-resident country experts drawn from policy analysts,

academics and journalists. The number of countries covered as well as the number of
responses vary from source to source. For instance, CIESIN covered 95 countries and
received 224 replies, IMD 51 countries with roughly 4,000 replies while WEF covered
117 countries and received 10,993 replies from a constituency consisting of senior
business leaders of domestic and international companies. As to the nature of the
questions broached in the survey there is wide variation again. While the subject matter
under consideration is corruption in broad terms the questions vary in terms of
specificity. For instance, the II focuses on the economic costs of corrupt behaviour
including the issue of nepotism in the context of public contracts, IMD on bribery and
corruption in the economy, and FH27 on the extent of corruption as practiced in
17 http://www.ciesin.org .
18 http://www.eiu.com .
19 http://www.freedomhouse.org .
20 http://www.information-international.com .
21 http://www.imd.ch .
22 http://www.merchantinternational.com .
23 http://www.asiarisk.com.
24 http://www.uneca.org.
25 http://www.weforum.org.
26 http://www.globalinsight.com.
27 The country reports (Nations in Transit) are in essay format where the authors provide a broad analysis
of the country of their expertise. However FH provides a checklist of questions on seven categories which
includes corruption. They also provide guidelines for ratings.
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governments as perceived by the public and as reported in the media, laws on financial
disclosure and conflict of interest
initiatives.

as well as the implementation of anticorruption

While the TI has made every effort to ensure some sort of parity in

methodology by taking into account the use of a ranking system and subject focus in the
selection criteria of the sources used for the corruption index there is wild deviation
between the sources in terms of detail. Survey questions vary, some focusing solely on
corruption in the public sector. They utilise people from different backgrounds to arrive
at their data, some rely on the business sector while others on country experts. Regardless
of the concerns about lack of a uniform approach in data collection what TI has
highlighted is that corruption is perceived as a global problem, be it in a business or in a
wider context. While the TI does not provide us with a knowledge of true reality it
nevertheless provides a shadowy representation sufficiently convincing to influence a
multitude of international and regional institutions to draft corruption specific instruments
with the result that the fight against corruption has been internationalised. The growth in
the number of international initiatives is an indicator of the high profile given to
corruption by policymakers and politicians. Regardless of the impact of TI on national
and international law-making there is still the pressing issue of whether the methodology
of arriving at corruption levels could be made more robust in providing knowledge of the
true extent of the problem. What has to be realised is that corruption is a secretive activity
and as such we are reliant on reflections . All that we can do is to sharpen these
reflections. This may be achievable by increasing the survey sample and ensuring greater
homogeneity in the constituency and harmonisation of the survey questions.

3. Regulatory Measures: The Conventions
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Regulation,28 using a variegated mix of cautions, fines, loss of freedom, and incentives, is
a popular choice amongst policy makers and politicians as a means of achieving the
desired goal. It exploits the psychological aspects of human beings. Fear of loss of
freedom and social stigma attached to criminal records, for instance are all seen as
sufficiently effective to deter29 undesirable behaviour and mould the social condition of
mankind to a preconceived standard. Given the human propensity towards a degree of
unpredictability and an inclination towards rule ignoring, sanctions play an important role
in guiding human choice. Their negative impact on a person’s identity and status both in
the short and long term may ‘persuade’ the person to reconsider their motivations and
desires. Sanctions, however, do not serve the moulding of human behaviour as well one
would expect as made apparent by crime statistics. In these circumstances we have to ask
whether there are alternatives to regulation that might work better, an issue that will be
explored in Part 5 below.
To tackle the global problem of corruption international institutions and regional
groupings look to criminal law as a means of regulating human behaviour. Since 1996,
eight conventions have been adopted for combating corruption. Of these, seven

30

see

criminal law as the vehicle for combating corruption. Given the number of international
and regional institutions involved in drafting corruption combating legislative
frameworks for adoption by Contracting States it would be reasonable to expect that there
has been mutual co-operation between the various regional bodies and international
institutions resulting in a largely harmonised and a comparatively uniform legislative
approach to fighting corruption amongst the Contracting States. Unfortunately the
28

Use of regulation as a means of solving various social problems has been on the increase world wide.
Whenever there is a perceived social problem the answer for legislators seems to lie in legislation. The
UK is no stranger to this approach. (See Hall S Drifting into a Law and Order Society 1980 London:
Cobden Trust Williams P & Dickensen J ‘Fear of Crime’ 1993 British Journal of Criminology 33.) The
recent introduction of Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) in the UK to tackle socially disruptive
behaviour of largely teenagers and young adults is one such illustration. There is always the danger that
such regulation may be used as part of a public relations exercise by the government of the day to indicate
to the public that it is taking its paternalistic role seriously. With a twist of cynicism it may also be seen as
intricately linked to electoral results.
29
According to Vogelson J M it seems that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has deterred the corrupt
practices of US firms. See ‘Report of the ABA Committee on Corrupt Practices to the ABA’ 1996 (30)
International Lawyer 194.
30 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999 deals with civil actions for those who
have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption. It came into force on I November 2003 and has
received 27 ratifications or accessions. See Carr, I ‘Civil Law and Corruption’ (forthcoming).
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conventions vary in terms of both substantive and procedural provisions, and
comprehensiveness. Lack of conformity between the conventions means that the
Contracting States are likely to tackle the issue of corruption in different ways thus
leaving the door wide open to uncertainties,

extradition in the context of transnational

corruption being one of these.
It is not the intention here to examine the provisions of each convention in great
detail. The aim here is to amplify the differences and points of departure by focusing on
specific topics: corruption and corruption-related offences; preventive measures; mutual
assistance and international co-operation with the intention of highlighting the lack of
coherence in the current international legal frameworks. The

conventions that are

considered for this purpose are chronologically:
i)

Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption 1996 (hereinafter “OAS Convention);31

ii)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions 1997 (hereinafter “OECD Convention”)32

iii)

Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on
European Union on the Fight Against Corruption involving Officials of the
European Union Communities or Officials of Member States of the European
Union 1999 (hereinafter “EU Convention”)33

31

Came into force on 6 March 1997 and the following countries have ratified or acceded to it: Argentina,
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas (Commonwealth), Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent &
Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
32
Came into force on 15 February 1999 and has received ratifications or accessions from Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.
33
Still in the process of receiving ratifications. See also Council Framework Decision 2003.568/JHA of 22
July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (OJ L 192 of 31.07.2003). According to Art 249 of
the EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam a decision is binding in its entirety upon those to
whom it is addressed.
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iv)

Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 (hereinafter
“COE Convention)34

v)

Southern

African

Development

(Hereinafter “SADC Protocol”)
vi)

Protocol

Against

Corruption

2001

35

African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003
(hereinafter “AU Convention);36

vii)

United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 (hereinafter “UN
Convention”);37

viii)

Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal law Convention on
Corruption 2003 (hereinafter “COE Protocol”)38

A. Corruption – The Scope
The starting place for any convention is its scope. It would be normal to expect the
conventions to define the word ‘corruption’. Admittedly corruption is a fairly complex
concept due to its multi-dimensional character and the word is used in a variety of senses
from moral degradation to the economic benefit obtained by an individual in a position of

34

Came into force on 1 July 2002 and has received ratifications from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and United Kingdom.
35
Not yet in force. So far the following have ratified : Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, South
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
36
Came into force on 5 August 2006. It has been ratified by Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros,
Congo Libya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
37
Came into force on 14 December 2005. So far the following ratifications or accessions have taken place:
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China,
Congo, Croatia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sao tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of
Tanzania, and Yemen.
38
Came into force on 1 February 2005 and ratifications were received from Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenis,
Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and United Kingdom.

11

power by virtue of that individual’s role within an organisation.

39

In practice, the

conventions, other than the SADC Protocol,40 refrain from providing a general definition
of corruption but focus on specific types of corrupt behaviour. It is however possible on
the basis of the offences created by these conventions to group them into two conceptual
frameworks. I call these ‘Framework A’ and ‘Framework B’ for convenience sake.
Corruption, as stated earlier, can occur in different contexts but much of the corruption
reported is in the context of public sector, be it at the petty or at the grand level. It is not
uncommon to hear many anecdotes of petty corruption from those living in developing
countries. The classic form of corruption, bribe, is a regular phenomenon in seeking the
provision of basic services such as an electric or telephone connection from government
owned utilities. At the grand level corruption veers its ugly head in a variety of situations
ranging from public procurement contracts, the obtaining of licences and permits, foreign
direct investment, construction contracts, through to tax incentives and arms deals.
Framework A targets corruption in the public sector and addresses the issue of
abuse/misuse of power by those in public office for private gain.41 Three of the
conventions listed above, the OAS Convention, the OECD Convention, and the EU
Convention concentrate solely on corruption of public officials though they vary in terms
of scoping corrupt behaviour and defining public officials.
While corruption is much talked about in relation to government employees
corruption is found also in the private sector. Wherever an individual is in a position of
power and has opportunities to exercise discretion, be it directly or indirectly, in the
decision making process opportunities for engaging in corrupt behaviour present
themselves. Framework B conventions focus on the abuse/misuse of power in the
decision making process for obtaining an undue advantage and are broader in scope than
those Framework A conventions that relate to the public sector. Of course the types of

39 See Carr, I ‘Corruption in Africa: Is the African Union Convention the Answer?’ forthcoming Journal of
Business Law.
40
Art 1 defines corruption as “any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other behaviour in
relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their
duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and
aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others”. See ‘Framework B’ below for
more on Art 3.
41
The World Bank adopts this definition of corruption. See Ofusu-Amaah, W P , Soopramanien, R and
Uprety, K Combating Corruption (1999) Washington DC: The World Bank.
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misuse, and the kinds of undue advantage outlawed vary between the conventions as the
following paragraphs show.
1. Framework A
The OAS Convention is the earliest anti-corruption convention with the prime objective
of eradicating corruption in the performance of public functions and has the following
features:
•

It creates corruption offences both in the context of mutual exchange between the
offeror and the recipient and where there is no mutual exchange;

•

It includes corrupt activities of both public officials and foreign public officials;

•

It covers both passive bribery (solicitation and acceptance by a public official of a
benefit in return for an act or omission) and active bribery (offering or granting
of a benefit to a public official in return for the doing or not doing of act); and

•

It creates a controversial offence of illicit enrichment.

The first corruption offence created by this convention is that of bribery. The solicitation
or acceptance, or the offering or granting, directly or indirectly of any article of monetary
value or other benefit in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his
public functions by a governmental official or public official is made an offence.42 The
advantage gained by the public official can be for himself or another party and is not
restricted to money but can include other advantages, a gift or a favour such as a holiday,
a job, or a training contract for a third party. The term ‘public official’, construed to
include government employees and those performing services in the name of the State, is
sufficiently wide to include besides civil servants those working in public undertakings
such as state trading corporations, various state agencies, and the judiciary. The OAS
Convention has an extra-territorial dimension and makes active bribery of a foreign
public official an offence.43 Foreign public official is not defined as such but presumably
the definition of a public official referred to above will be relevant.
42 Arts VI(1)(a) & (b). According to Art I ‘public official’, ‘government official’ or ‘public servant’ refers
to any official or employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been selected, appointed,
or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of State or in the services of the State, at any level
of its hierarchy. For further on this convention see Sutton R H ‘Controlling Corruption through Collective
Means: Advocating the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption’ 1997 (20) Fordham International
Law Journal 1427.
43 Art VIII. Note that the OECD Convention deals with corruption of a foreign public official in
international business transactions.
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The OAS Convention, as stated earlier, addresses corrupt acts that do not involve
a mutual exchange. Art VI includes acts or omissions by a public official for the purpose
of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party. This will cover acts such as
failure to record donations and their diversion for personal or third party use. Since gains
derived from corrupt behaviour are likely to be concealed the Convention also makes the
use and concealment of property derived through corrupt acts as outlined in the
Convention an offence.44
An interesting but questionable offence included in the OAS Convention is the
offence of illicit enrichment. This is also found in a number of other conventions45 and
has been a source of some debate. According to Art IX “each State Party that has not yet
done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a
significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably
explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions. Among
those States that have established illicit enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be
considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this Convention”. This article has
been the source of some contention since it seems to place the burden on the accused to
show that he has obtained his assets in a lawful manner. 46 In some jurisdictions this may
be seen as a necessary provision where there is total disregard of the law. Regardless, it
goes against the grain of the expectation of a fair trial and right against self-incrimination
enshrined in the various human rights treaties.
The next convention in chronological order which falls within Framework A is
the

OECD Convention.47 Unlike the OAS Convention the OECD deals only with

transnational bribery and makes criminal active bribery of a foreign public official in the
44 Art VI(1)(d).
45
AU Convention and UN Convention.
46 See Gantz D A ‘Globalising Sanction Against Foreign Bribery The Emergence of an International Legal
Consensus’ 1998 (18) North Western Journal of International Law and Business 457.
47 This was preceded by an Anti- bribery Recommendation 1994. For further on this see Buchan, D &
Graham, G ‘OECD Members Agree Action to Curb Bribery of Foreign Official’ Financial Times April 30,
1994. The OECD Convention is influenced by the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enacted in 1977
(hereinafter “FCPA”), when it became clear that multinationals such as Mobil and Lockheed were making
payments to heads of states and senior civil servants for obtaining lucrative contracts. For further on this
see Longobardi, L E ‘Reviewing the Situation: What is to be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act?’ 1987 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 431. In broad terms, the FCPA applies to persons
(legal and natural) subject to US jurisdiction and makes payments intended to influence a foreign public
official in the decision or decision making process an offence. There are also special provisions in respect
of accounting procedures.
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context of international business transaction. This restricted ambit is not surprising given
its historical antecedents in the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977. The OECD
Convention focuses on the bribe giver and makes active bribery an offence. A promise
given directly or indirectly, a pecuniary or other advantage to a public official in order
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the context of an international
business transaction is an offence. There is no definition of international business
transaction but its interpretation is likely to be guided by mercantile custom and
international conventions48 and would presumably include transactions where parties to
a business agreement are located in different jurisdictions.
The next instrument that restricts itself to the corrupt acts of public officials is the
EU Convention.

49, 50

This Convention addresses both active and passive corruption51

(namely, bribe offering and bribe soliciting) involving community and national officials.
The meaning of national official is to be determined by reference to the definition of
‘official’ or ‘public officer’ in the national law52 of the Member State whereas the
meaning of the ‘community official’53 is to be established by reference to the staff

48 International conventions relating to international sales such as the Vienna Convention on International
Sales of Goods 1980 construe internationality in terms of the seller and buyer’s place of business. See Art
I(1).
49 There has been some reluctance among the Member States in respect of a EU wide criminal justice
policy and this reluctance is understandable. For an interesting discussion on this aspect see Cloud, M
‘Organized Crime, RICO and the European Union’ 2000 (27) Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce 243. According to the TI corruption index among the EU 25 Greece, Italy, the Czech Republic
and Poland have performed poorly compared to the other EU Member States and do not show any signs of
improvement.
50 Text available OJ C 195, 1997, p2. See also Convention Drawn up on the Basis of the Article K3 of the
Treaty of the European Union to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial
Interests (OJ C 313 1996, p2) and Protocol Drawn up on the Basis of Article K3 of the Treaty of the
European Union to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities Financial Interests (OJ
V 11 1998, p,5). The Convention on financial interests came into force on October 17, 2002. Note that Art
20 of the EU Treaty lists the prevention and combating of corruption as one of the objectives of the creation
of a European area of freedom, security and justice, The 1999 Tampere European Council identified
corruption as a sector of particular relevance and the instruments that have resulted aim an approximating
national legislation and the development of a general EU policy towards corruption. The European
Parliament has also set its sight on corruption in developing countries and has recently published its
‘Report on Aid Effectiveness and Corruption in Developing Counties’ (RR\365027EN.doc of 27.2.2006)
and adopted a European Parliament Resolution on Aid Effectiveness and Corruption in Developing
Countries (2005/2141(INI)) on 6 April 2006.
51
See Arts 2 & 3.
52 Art 1(c). Of course the meaning of ‘public official’ is likely to vary amongst the Member States. See
Measures to Prevent Corruption in the Member States of the European Union, Working Paper of the
European Parliament JURI 101 EN, Luxembourg 03-1998.
53
Art 1(b)
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regulation of the European Communities and includes those seconded to the European
Communities by the European States.
All of the above conventions are restrictive in scope in that they all focus on
bribery with the exception of the OAS Convention which seems to reach farther into the
recesses of human behaviour that could be classified as corrupt.

2. Framework B
The public sector in developing countries is often seen as the breeding ground for
corruption. Since the public sector in these countries provides basic utilities with a huge
consumer base many members of the public have experienced some level of bribery at
the petty level. Some of the developing countries have therefore privatised54 or semiprivatised the utilities sector hoping that this would curb corruption. Since the private
sector is profit seeking inevitably the charges of these utilities, once privatised, are high
and puts them out of the reach of the low income group. This in its own way breeds
corruption at the petty level, for instance, on the part of those taking meter readings for
the purposes of billing by entering a lower meter reading or tampering with the
mechanical parts of the meter to show a lower consumption in return for a payment.
Private sector corruption however is not restricted to the petty level. It is
commonplace for senior managers to engage in corrupt activities in various contexts, for
instance, in procurement and compromising confidential and sensitive company
information. To root out corruption it is essential that the private sector is also included in
the regulatory framework.
The earliest convention to include both the public and private sector is the COE
Convention, focusing on the abuse of power in return for an undue advantage regardless
of the context in which it occurs. In also takes a comprehensive approach in construing
the term ‘public official’.55 The convention dispels doubts about which services are or

54

Note also that privatisation is one the conditions imposed by the World Bank when providing loans to
finance projects in developing countries. See Carr, I ‘Corruption, the World Bank and Conditionalities’
(forthcoming).
55
Art 1(a) defines ‘public official’ as “shall be understood by reference to the definition of ‘official’,
‘public officer’, ‘mayor’, ‘minister’ or ‘judge’ in the national law of the State in which the person in
question performs that function and as applied in its criminal law.”
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are not included in the public sector by including specific provisions relating to active
and passive bribery of domestic public officials,56 bribery of members of domestic public
assemblies,57

foreign

public

assemblies,58

international

parliamentary

59

assemblies officials of international organisations, and judges and officials of
international courts.60 The COE Protocol extends the list to include bribery of domestic
and foreign arbitrators, and domestic and foreign jurors.61. However it fails in its
comprehensiveness when it comes to the creation of offences. Corruption is construed
within a narrow band that includes acts of active and passive bribery both at the domestic
and international level62, and trade in influence over persons in the public sector such as
domestic or foreign public officials, members of domestic and international
parliamentary assemblies.

The judiciary

is separately addressed in Art 12.

An

accounting offence is also created to address fraudulent practices such as the creation or
use of an invoice or other accounting document containing false or incomplete
information, and unlawfully omitting to make a record of payment.63
A more comprehensive approach is adopted by the next three conventions in the
chronological list : SADC Protocol, AU Convention and the UN Convention. The first
two are regional conventions and likely therefore to have a limited impact unlike the UN
Convention which is a truly international convention.
Turning our attention to the two African conventions, the SADC Protocol64
provides a definition in its Article 1 and focuses on the abuse of power in return for
undue advantage. The specific acts of corruption condoned are listed in Art 3 and include
active and passive bribery be it by a public official or a person working in the private
sector, act or omission by a public official for illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or a
third party, diversion by a public official of property, monies or securities of the State,

56

See Arts 2 & 3.
Art 4.
58
Art 6.
59
Art 20.
60
Art 11.
61 Arts 2 – 6.
62
Arts 2-11.
63
Art 14.
64
The following countries are members of the SADC: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Most of these countries figure as highly corrupt in the TI index.
57
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individual or independent agency received by virtue of his position for his own benefit or
that of a third party, the fraudulent use or concealment of property described from corrupt
acts as listed in Art 3, and participation as principal, co-principal, agent, instigator,
collaborator or accessory after the fact. The SADC Protocol also has a transnational
aspect and includes the bribery of a foreign public official in its list of offences.
The AU Convention simply lists specific acts of corruption and related offences
but in doing so is much wider in scope. It includes in its list passive and active bribery in
the public and the private sector, the controversial provision on illicit enrichment, trading
in influence, diversion of funds and concealment of funds resulting from acts of
corruption. The classic example of corruption, bribery, is addressed in Art 4 and includes
both the direct or indirect solicitation or acceptance by a public official65 or a person in
the private sector of an undue advantage in exchange for an act or omission in the
performance of his public function, or in breach of his duties.66 The AU Convention, like
the OAS Convention, includes the controversial offence of illicit enrichment where a
public official or any other person cannot reasonably explain the possession of those
assets.67 The points made in respect of the offence of illicit enrichment in the OAS
Convention equally apply here. Laundering or concealment of proceeds from corrupt
activities is also made an offence.68 The AU Convention includes an interesting provision
on the funding of political parties. It expects the Contracting States to proscribe the use of
funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties and
incorporate the principle of transparency in such funding.69 This is a welcome provision
since it is common practice in many developing countries to channel the proceeds of
crime through the funding of political parties.
The AU Convention does not include bribery of a foreign public official within its
list of corruption offences which is a surprise omission since a number of African
businesses do engage in international investment , South Africa being one example.
65 Public official is defined in Art 1 as “any official or employee of the State or its agencies including those
who have been selected, appointed or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or
in the service of the State at any level of its hierarchy.” The definition is sufficiently wide to encompass all
sectors including the judiciary and prosecuting authorities.
66
Arts 4(1)(a) – (e).
67
Arts 4(1)(g) and 8.
68
Arts 4 and 6.
69
Art 10.
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The UN Convention is the latest corruption related convention and it is expected
to have a noticeable and successful international impact since it seems to have the
support of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and policymakers from developing and developed countries. Indeed countries have
made known their adherence to the UN Convention when passing legislation to combat
corruption.70 It is much wider in scope than the previous two conventions in the group of
three considered in this section. It criminalizes bribery of national officials,71 foreign
public officials,72 officials of public international organisations,73 bribery in the private
sector,74 embezzlement of property both in the public and private sector,75 trading in
influence,76 illicit enrichment,77 abuse of function,78and laundering and concealing the
proceeds of corruption.79 In taking a comprehensive approach it also addresses aspects
that may hinder enforcement and criminalises the use of physical force, threats or the
offer of a bribe to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or
production of evidence. Equally intimidation of officials in order to interfere with the
exercise of their official duties in respect of the offences created by the Convention is
made an offence.80
B. Sanctions
As with other international criminal conventions81 the approach towards sanctions is one
of minimal interference or no interference in some cases. The SADC Protocol, the AU
Convention and the OAS Convention subscribe to the latter approach in remaining silent
in respect of penalties

leaving it to the Contracting State to decide how to deal with

offenders. It is indeed difficult to understand why the regional agreements have remained
silent on this issue since members of regional organizations have normally come together
70

See South African Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 No 12 of 2004.
Art 15.
72
Art 16.
73
Ibid.
74
Art 21.
75
Arts 17 and 22.
76
Art 18.
77
Art 20.
78
Art 19.
79
Arts 23 and 24.
80
Art 25.
81
E.g. Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime 2003.
71
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to pursue common aims and may be expected to achieve these aims through the same
means. The reason for the silence may be to avoid the rather sensitive and emotive issue
of sovereignty given that a number of countries in these continents have troubling issues
ranging from boundary disputes to political and civil unrest. To intervene in criminal
justice matters could be seen as an encroachment of matters that should be left to the
Contracting State to decide in keeping with its policy on criminal justice. The other
conventions take a minimalist approach. The EU Convention, the OECD Convention, and
the COE Convention in general terms expects the sanctions to be effective, proportionate
and dissuasive and provides some indication of the range of sanctions that could be used
for punishing corrupt conduct. This includes

fines and loss of liberty.82 The UN

Convention appears to sit somewhere in the middle though it can be said that it is perhaps
more willing to cover other aspects of criminal justice since Art 41 for instance states that
States may take “any previous conviction in another State for the purpose of using such
information in criminal proceedings relating to an offence established in accordance with
[the UN] Convention.” While including a provision on sanctions it does not go as far as
the European driven conventions in giving any indication of the forms the sanctions can
take. In Art 30(1) it simply states that the gravity of the offence must be taken into
account in determining the sanction but that loss of liberty is contemplated to be amongst
the types of sanction is apparent from Art 30(5) which mentions early release and parole.
C. Preventive Measures
Prevention through the participation of citizens, those affected by corruption and closing
the current loopholes in existing law such as banking law that may be used to deposit the
proceeds of corruption are important means of fighting corruption. The UN Convention
once again is expansive in its approach to prevention of corruption and deals with bank
secrecy, 83 prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime, 84 the creation of
financial intelligence units,

85

participation of society,

82

86

See Art 19 COE Convention, Art 3 OECD Convention, Art 5 EU Convention.
Art 40.
84
Art 52.
85
Art 58.
86
Art 13.
83
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improving accounting

procedures and introducing codes of conduct. 87 The OAS Convention also specifically
addresses the issue of preventive measures in Art V ranging from codes of conduct, a
system for registering assets of public official to participation of civil society. A similar
approach is to be found in the AU Convention88 and SADC Protocol.89 The OECD
Convention is the least prescriptive and requires Contracting States to adopt measures in
terms of better accounting practices,

90

while the EU Convention and the COE

Convention do not contain any specific provisions on preventive mechanisms.
D. Mutual Assistance and Co-operation
All the conventions contain provisions on mutual assistance and international cooperation in the investigation and obtaining of evidence. The UN Convention covers this
area in an extensive manner and includes various provisions detailing co-operation
between national authorities,91 and between national authorities and the private
sector,92international co-operation,93 mutual legal assistance,

94

law enforcement co-

operation, 95 and extradition.96 The OAS Convention,97 the OECD Convention, the AU
Convention,98 the COE Convention and the SADC Protocol99 contain provisions on
mutual legal assistance and co-operation except they vary greatly in terms of detail. For
instance, the OECD Convention provides for mutual legal assistance and extradition,100
while the COE Convention goes into greater depth
between national authorities,

101

mutual assistance,

87

Art 12.
Arts 5, 12 and 17.
89
Art 4.
90
Art 8.
91
Art 38.
92
Art 39.
93
Art 43.
94
Art 46.
95
Art 48.
96
Art 44.
97
See Arts XIII & XIV.
98
See Arts 18 and 19.
99
See Arts 9 and 10.
100
Arts 9 and 10.
101
Art 21.
102
Art 26.
103
Art 27.
88
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102

by providing for co-operation
extradition103 and outlining the

general principles and measures for international co-operation,104 while the EU
Convention contemplates mutual assistance between EU Member States.105
E. Some Remarks on the Current State of Affairs
The list of conventions and the number of ratifications received by these conventions is
impressive. Should this be heralded as a sign of success on the part of the international
legislative community? Far from it. It exhibits a lack of concerted effort on the part
regional and international institutions. The presence of this number of conventions is
bound to leave states wondering which convention to ratify or alternatively which model
to base their own legislation on. It is interesting to see that a number of states have
become serial ‘ratifiers’. This may be indicative of their seriousness to tackle corruption
and perhaps a desire to ensure that all forms of corrupt behaviour are addressed in their
jurisdiction. And where the serial ‘ratifier’ is a developing country it may be motivated
by socio-economic reasons – to attract foreign investors and to show to lending agencies
like the World Bank and European Bank for Re-construction and Development that
corruption is not tolerated. In practice, ratification of a number of conventions creates
ample room for uncertainties. To illustrate, if state S has ratified and implemented the
OECD Convention, COE Convention and the UN Convention when it comes to the
interpretation of the term ‘foreign public official’ which of the travaux preparatoires is
the judiciary going to turn to for guidance?
The existence of the many conventions on the subject-matter of corruption is
perhaps a result of historical and political accident. The OECD Convention was the result
of pressure from the US which had passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977
expecting that other industrialized countries would follow suit. Instead it found that it
was alone in penalizing the activities of their businesses abroad which affected the
international competitiveness of US businesses abroad. Equally, the OAS Convention
was very much a product of the US policy making in the Americas. The regional
conventions in Africa emerged in response to the need to contribute to the socioeconomic development of the region. And since there was no convention that applied in

104
105

Art 25.
Arts 8 and 9.

22

Europe the Council of Europe drafted the two conventions, one civil and the other
criminal, for ratification by their member states,
The anti-corruption agenda has evolved slowly through initiatives from a number
of institutions and it is now perceived on the international scene as an agenda worth
pursuing vigorously. Even

developing countries are embracing regulation to curb

corruption enthusiastically, judging from the number of ratifications for the various
conventions. Therefore it is now time to ask whether any good is being done by still
having so many conventions in force. All that it does is promote uncertainty since they
diverge in scope, substance and procedure. The time has come to have in place just one
convention that is comprehensive, forward looking and includes extensive and
meaningful extra-legal measures including corporate social responsibility for the
prevention of corruption. This move might be opposed on the ground that countries will
not wish to yet again engage in the drafting, adoption and ratification of a new
convention. That need not be the case. There is a convention that possesses these
qualities – the UN Convention on Corruption 2003. Perhaps it is time that countries
simply ratify this Convention and denounce their ratifications to other conventions.
Admittedly the UN Convention may have some shortcomings – for instance ambiguities
in respect of sanctions. These can be refined where desired and needed since the
Convention does make room for proposing amendments five years after its entry into
force according to Art 69.

4. Enforcement and Informers
The adoption of a convention and its ratification by a State only goes part of the way in
countering corruption. For any regulation to be hailed a success it has to be adopted
sufficiently seriously by the people so as to influence their behaviour when faced with
choices as for instance where a person is influenced by the knowledge of the illegality
of receiving a bribe in declining an offer of a bribe to speed up the process of obtaining
a passport. However, given man’s proclivity towards exercising free will it is not always
the case that regulation of itself will achieve the aim of controlling his behaviour. Hence
enforcement plays an important role in making sense of regulation. Regulation in the
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absence of enforcement is meaningless and at best, is a political exercise that does not
serve the citizens of a state well.

In ratifying

an international convention and

implementing it through criminal legislation a Contracting State accepts responsibilities
both to the international community and to its citizens – it is a public commitment to the
legislation and to see that it is enforced. After all, the aim of criminalisation of certain
types of behaviour through law is to protect society from their detrimental effects, and
in the case of corruption, it is to promote economic prosperity and to protect the weaker
sections of societies from the debilitating effects of poverty, and to ensure fairness and
integrity.
Much of the corrupt activity is of a secretive nature and parties to a corrupt
transaction are unlikely to conduct their affairs in the open for all to see. The enforcement
of anti-corruption legislation is therefore dependant on sophisticated investigative
techniques, both overt106 and covert. Periodic surveillance of

officials, undercover

operations, use of banks to report unusually large transactions and their scrutiny may be
ways of exposing corrupt behaviour. However such proactive techniques, if adopted,
need to be balanced against human rights obligations of the State, so that there is no
infringement of the right to privacy, right against self-incrimination, and property related
rights.107 Investigative techniques such as surveillance and examination of bank accounts
are of limited use and are dependent upon an investigative and enforcement service with
ample financial and personnel provision. Police informers108 are cultivated, nurtured and
widely used by police authorities globally and are perceived as a vital tool in the

106

Overt technique is where the police respond to complaints of crime from victims. For more on the types
of police work see Marx G T Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (1988) Berkeley: University of
California Press; Ashworth A The Criminal Process (1994) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
107
Ss 26(8) and 29(1) of the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 allows the use of a human
intelligence source under some circumstances. See also Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14;
Halford v United Kingdom (1998) 24 EHRR 53; Teixra de Casro v Portugal (1999) 28 EHRR 101. For an
interesting article on participating informers see Gillespie, A ‘The Legal Use of Participating Informers’
2005 (5) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues.
108 According to a survey of police officers in respect of drug related offences the use of police
informants was seen as more cost-effective when compared with surveillance operations. Registered
informants were regarded as a reliable tool for gathering intelligence on market structures. See May, T;
Harocopos, A; Turnbull, PJ and Hough, M ‘Serving UP: The Impact of Low-level Police Enforcement on
Drug Markets’ Police Research Series Paper 133 (2000) London: PRCC Unit Publications.
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detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities,109 and more so in respect
of hidden criminal activity such as corruption.110
While the use of informers (also known as ‘informants’, ‘police sources’)111 is
widespread there is limited research on their background and their motivations in
imparting information to the police. The available research112 in this largely ‘secretive’
policing activity suggests that most of the informers are in some way connected to the
criminal fraternity directly or indirectly though there are the few who are not.

Their

motivations vary. Some are tempted by the police reward whilst others may divulge
information in return for immunity or for a reduction in sentence or for the purposes of
protecting loved ones from getting involved with the criminal fraternity. Revenge is also
cited as a reason for providing police with information. And there are those who are
driven by moral principles and act for the greater good. In most cases there is some sort
of exchange between the informer and the informed, be it of money, leniency in
sentencing or some other favour.113 It is indeed very difficult to gauge the success of this
mechanism in the context of corruption. Regardless of various mechanisms that the
police may have in place in accessing information from ‘good’ sources the reliability of
such information is debatable and may result in miscarriages of justice.114

109 See Haglund, E ‘Impeaching the Underworld Informant’ 1990 (63) Southern California Law Review
1407; Oscapella, E ‘A Study of Informers in England’ 1980 The Criminal Law Review 136; Lawler L E
‘Police Informer Privilege: A Study for the Law Reform Commission of Canada’ 1986 (28:2) The Criminal
Law Quarterly 91; Maguire, M and John, T Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants; Integrated
Approaches 1995 London: Home Office Research Group
110 See Parker, R ‘Confidential Informants and the Truth Finding Function’ 1986 (4) Cooley Law Review
565.
111 I use the term ‘informers’ here to refer to ‘informants’ and ‘police sources’ and do not draw any
distinctions thus following the general trend in research related to police informers. However, according to
McCabe RJ ‘informants’ refer to those who unwittingly or wittingly (for no reward) give information to
the police, while ‘source’ is a generic term for anyone who gives information to the police, and ‘informers’
are those who for personal reward or personal motivation give information to the police and are in some
way related to the criminal community. McCabe RJ ‘Procedures to be Adopted for Management, Control
and Evaluation of Sources of Information’ (1989) Unpublished Report as cited in Police Informants: A
Discussion Paper on the Nature and Management of the Relationship between Police and their Informants
(1993) Sydney: ICAC.
112
See Rose, D In the Name of the Law (1996) London: Vantage Press; Greer, S Supergrasses: A Study in
the Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland (1995) London: Clarendon Press.
113
See Billingsley, R, Nemitz, T & Bean, P Informers (2001) Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.
114
See Martin D L ‘The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative Study’ in
Westervelt S and Humphreys J (eds) Wrongfully Convicted: When Justice Fails (2001) Piscataway, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
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Neither covert surveillance techniques nor the use of informers are viable
techniques in the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation due to their high financial
costs and the high risk of unreliability of information obtained. Financial costs will cause
concern to developing countries that do not have sufficient revenue to invest in basic
infrastructure for a number of reasons ranging from civil war to border conflicts and
defence expenditure.
A class of informant who may be able to provide better quality information in
terms of reliability for enforcement purposes is the whistleblower – employees from
within an organisation who expose malpractices within their organisations. Since
whistleblowers are likely to face reprisals at their place of employment some of the
adopted anti-corruption conventions require that legislation protecting whistleblowers be
passed in states ratifying the conventions.115 Jurisdictions such as the UK,116 South
Africa,117 Australia,

118

and the US119 have whistleblower protection legislation. Since

whistleblowers divulge malpractices within their organisations they have the potential to
play an important role in curbing grand corruption – for instance, where their
organisation is engaged in corrupt practices in tendering for overseas contracts.
While the legislation may guarantee legal protection to a whistleblower, it is
debatable whether this of itself will be sufficient to enable an individual to come forward
to report questionable activities within an organisation.

There are no available

comparative statistics relating to number of complaints about malpractices involving
whistleblowers to assess the success of the legislation. However, what is overlooked are
the likely psychological effects such as stress and the social aftermath of a disclosure on
the individual who discloses.120 Society at large including his fellow employees and other
employers in the sector perceive such an act on the part of an individual as exhibiting
disloyalty towards the employers and fellow employees, and the individual will have to
bear the cross of disloyalty regardless of whatever legal protection that may be
115

See for example Art 4(e) SADC Protocol, Art 5(5) AU Convention.
Public Disclosures Act 1999.
117
Public Disclosures Act 2000.
118
Public Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) as amended 1998.
119
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.
120
See Westin A F, Kurtz, H I, Robbins, A (eds) Whistle-blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation
(1981) New York; McGraw-Hill, Bucy P H ‘Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World’ 2002
(39:4) Houston Law Review 944.
116
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provided.121 This cross may prove to be too burdensome. The contribution that
whistleblower legislation may make towards enforcement of anti-corruption legislation
is likely to be minimal unless social attitudes towards whistleblowers change. This could
happen over time through what I call re-socialization122 of the general populace by
imparting the importance of good practice in the conduct of business practice – be it in
the public sector or private - and promoting the need for striking a balance between
acting for the greater good and self-seeking behaviour.
Given the financial costs of surveillance and the limited usefulness of police
informers are there any other legal means through which anti-corruption legislation could
be enforced by members of the public? The answer may lie in action qui tam123 or the
common informer action abolished in Britain in 1951 with the Common Informers Act.
The origins of common informers action is traceable to the end of the 13th century. It
enabled individuals to initiate actions in the royal courts on their behalf and that of the
Crown.124 By the 16th century qui tam actions were explicitly or implicitly included in
statutes to overcome the difficulties in enforcing penal laws and the common informer
normally obtained a share of the fines that were to be received by the Crown. In an era
where there was no police force this seemed an ideal method for minimising the gap
between legislation and enforcement. The offer of a bounty preying on human greed
brings in its wake its own dangers. Predictably, many perceived informing as a lucrative
career and there are records of individuals taking on this activity seriously.125 It seems
that in the 16th century common informers played an important role in enforcing
economic regulation ranging from customs and foreign trade offences to marketing and
manufacturing offences.126 The usefulness of such informers however was short lived due
to abuse of the system by common informers, for instance extracting money from the law
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Glazer, M ‘Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared’ 1983 (13) Hasting Ctr Rpt 33.
See ‘Fighting Corruption through Re-Socialization’ below.
123
Short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitir (“who
pursues this action onour Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own”). See also Blackstone, W
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768) Book the Third, 160.
124
See Prior of Lewes v De Holt (1931) 48 Selden Society 198.
125
For an interesting article on George Whelplay who seems to have made a career as an informer in the
16th century see Elton G R ‘Informing for Profit: A Sidelight on Tudor Methods of Law-enforcement’
1954 (11:2) Cambridge Historical Journal 149.
126
For an excellent account on the use of the penal statutes see Beresford, M W ‘The Common Informer,
the Penal Statutes and Economic Regulation’ 1957 (10:2) The Economic History Review 221.
122

27

breaker with threat of a court action thus attracting unflattering comments. According to
Sir Edward Coke the informer “doth vex and pauperise the subject and the community of
the poorer sort, for malice or private ends and never for love of justice”.127 Qui tam
actions re-emerged in the 20th century as a force to reckon with in the context of the Lord
Day’s Observance Act 1781 and the Sunday Observance Act 1677. The abuse associated
with such actions however continued and in 1951 the common informers action was
abolished. The debates in the House of Commons exhibit the level of contempt towards
common informers. According to Sir Gerald Hurst the common informer is just a
“complete sneak who engages in legalised blackmail” and illustrated legal blackmail
thus:
In August last all the stars of the theatrical and cinema world in the
neighbourhood of Manchester intended to give a garden party for charity on a
Sunday afternoon. A man who lived over 180 miles away gave notice to the
police of infringement of the [Lord’s Day Observance] Act of 1781, and
threatened to bring action for penalties. That is what I call legalised blackmail.128
Independently of the attitudes towards common informers in Britain, the US in
1863 enacted the False Claims Act (hereinafter “FCA”) to root out fraud such as false
records, and false claims for payment on the part of contractors against the Government.
Since the aim of the FCA was to encourage informers to come forward with information
in return for a share of the fine in respect of such fraud it empowered citizens129 to bring
suit on behalf of the Government for fraud against the Government. Qui tam suits were
fairly common until amendments to the Act in 1943 following a controversial decision in
US ex rel. Marcus v Hess130, a case that held that the relator could bring a suit based on
information already possessed by the Government. The 1943 amendments put an end to
‘parasitical suits’ by disallowing actions based on information already known to the
Government. However, in the 1980s there was renewed interest on the part of the US
Congress in the FCA due to growing concerns about fraud against the Government,131
127

Institutes (Vol. III) as cited in Beresford, M W ibid. fn 5. Coke’s texts are available at
http://olldownload.liberty.fund.org .
128
Hansard House of Commons 1933-34 at 843; Hansard House of Commons 1950-1951 at 2079.
129
Known as ‘relators’ since the action is brought on relation of the citizen.
130
317 US 57 (1943)
131
US Code Congress & Administration News, 1986, 5266.

28

especially relating to defence contracts. The FCA was amended in 1986 so as to allow a
relator to bring a suit as long as he was the original source of the information and the
financial rewards were also substantially increased. As a consequence of these
amendments there has been a marked increase in qui tam actions and according to a
report from the US Department of Justice in 2005 the Justice Department recovered $1.4
billion in fraud and false claims. Of this figure $ 1.1 billion was recovered in association
with qui tam actions.132 The FCA, seen as a “primary weapon to fight government fraud”,
has been heralded by the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division of the US
Department of Justice as giving “ordinary citizens the courage and protection to blow the
whistle on government fraud”.133
It seems from the US experience that qui tam action has the potential to play an
important role in fighting corruption. On the one hand we have the British distrust of
common informers and strong doubts in respect of common informer actions in
furthering justice and, on the other we have their enthusiastic reception of the US law
enforcement institutions. The US success story in recovering huge amounts in fraud and
false claims is sufficiently persuasive for arguing for the introduction of qui tam actions
in exposing corruption. Of course, there is the danger of spurious actions and legalised
blackmail in the form of threats of initiating action to elicit money from the law breaker,
but it is possible to insert suitable safeguards to reduce the number of spurious claims as
in the FCA134 and to introduce stiff penalties for those abusing or misusing qui tam
actions for malicious ends. No doubt it will add another layer of bureaucracy and extra
pressures on the Attorney General and other relevant institutions within a country.
While there is a lot to be said for the views expressed by the British Members of
Parliament we have to be aware that circumstances are far different from those
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immediately

post World War II. We now live in a global community where the

defensiveness of borders have eroded by free trade and notions of sovereignty and the
idea of nation state has taken on new hues with the emergence of multinational
corporations as powerful economic and political entities. In their quest for increasing
their market share and market power corruption is simply a tool for furthering their
ambitions and they remain oblivious to the ensuing poverty in developing countries and
least developed countries. In these circumstances it is important to explore what may be
regarded as outdated actions to see whether these could provide useful tools to combat
corruption. Allowing qui tam actions in the corruption context is not a revolution. It is
simply resorting to private justice and this is not a novel idea. It can be traced back to
thirteenth century Britain except that now this private justice will work in partnership
with the judicial institutions of a state. The privatisation of justice is emerging in other
areas too – for instance in the use of mediation in international commercial contracts.135
Of course this resort to private-public partnership in matters of pursuing justice might not
suit countries where judicial institutions are still in the making or ineffective due to
interference from the political structures.
5. Fighting Corruption Through Re-socialization
While anti-corruption regulation in the form of an international convention is to be
welcomed it provides only a partial answer. Its biggest drawback is enforcement deficit.
As stated in the preceding part use of police informers is not a concrete method of
enforcing legislation since it carries with it a high element of risk. However sophisticated
risk assessment and risk management methods may be as reflected by the codes of
practice adopted by a law enforcement agency in their selection of informers, reliability
will continue to be a problem. Qui tam action and the ensuing private-public partnership
on the other hand may provide an interesting method to enhance enforcement of anticorruption legislation. It too has its pitfalls since it may attract bounty hunters who have
lost sight of justice and the checks in place to stop spurious actions may not always be
effective due to lack of personnel and other bureaucratic contingencies.
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The difficulties associated with enforcement brings with it the spectre of
hopelessness. There are, however, other means of making the populace realise the
harmful effects of corruption on the general welfare of citizens, be it at a global or at a
state level, and of the need to think of the greater good as opposed to engaging in selfseeking behaviour such as corruption. In re-socialisation, in making people aware of the
long term effects of corruption on the human condition, lies at least part of the answer. In
a world riddled with illiteracy, prejudices and ignorance, the re-socialisation process will
take time and effort. So how do we go about highlighting the short and long term ill
effects of corrupt behaviour on the part of the few on the greater whole and how do we
build in mechanisms other than legislation to curb and prevent corruption?
Educating people as to the detrimental effects of corruption and of their central
role in its prevention, I believe, holds part of the key. In the absence of knowledge of the
long term impact of corruption on the economic well being of a nation and its people
there is the danger that corruption may be seen simply as a quick fix solution for a
problem and a commonplace nuisance that a person has to put up with in obtaining a
licence, a contract, a job or a passport.
There are no immediately identifiable faces of victims of corruption. Since it is
not possible to point to X and Y as those who have suffered as a consequence of a corrupt
act, it is difficult fully to appreciate the effects of corruption. The victim of corruption,
however, is humanity, and humanity is the countless hungry and starving to be found
across all continents. An appreciation of corruption’s debilitating economic impact and
consequently its role as a breeding ground for local and global poverty must be made
widely known to the general public. This in turn will enable citizens to foster a common
goal and mobilise them to initiate steps necessary for eradicating a practice, a habit, that
runs counter to social justice, to promote the happiness and well-being of the greater
number. It is not a matter that should be left to the rarefied atmosphere of academics and
realm of the economists, policy makers, and legislators. There is no doubt that the bribing
of a public official, for instance, in a developing country to obtain a licence for installing
a chemical factory with lax health and safety standards may in the short term satisfy the
immediate needs of the multinational in meeting its financial and annual targets, the
expectations of the shareholders, and the living standards of the public official in the
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short term, and may also bring much needed employment in a poverty stricken area. But
longer term consequences also need to be taken into account. How does the behaviour of
the multinational affect other stakeholders: the employees, their families and others in the
state? How does it impact on competitors, forcing them to lower standards and cut
corners? How does it relate to the goal of happiness of the greater number? It does not
require much thought to predict the long term impact of this course of action though it
may not immediately be all that obvious. Lax health and safety standards is a tragedy
waiting to happen. The case of Union Carbide in Bhopal,136 India provides a good
illustration of the consequences of lax safety standards. It has caused long term human
suffering spilling into future generations in the form of genetic disorders and poverty,
since those affected are unable to provide for their families. The limited compensation
agreed upon is yet to reach the suffering. Admittedly, the above illustration of the
widespread agony for current and future generations is an extreme one. But regardless of
this, the detrimental effects of what may be considered innocuous and harmless forms of
corruption equally over time contributes to poverty and affects humanity. For instance,
the taking of bribes in order to tamper with electricity meters, beneficial to the consumer
and the bribe-taking official, causes economic harm to the provider and other customers.
This may lower the ability of the country to meet energy demands required for attracting
industries necessary for economic growth and prosperity.
That education is an important aspect of preventing corruption is also recognised
by the UN Convention in Art 8 titled “Participation of Society” which requires states to
undertake public education programmes, including school and university curricula that
contribute to non-tolerance of corruption. The inclusion of corruption in the curricula will
not of itself be sufficient to spread intolerance towards corrupt activities. Most
developing countries have low literacy rates amongst adults and much of the younger
population do not go to school because their families cannot afford to send them to
school. In some countries children as young as five work in appalling conditions in the
mining, carpet and construction industries. There is still a lot to be done in stopping the
exploitation of child labour and education but a discussion of this is beyond the scope of
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this article.137 Against this general backdrop the education of the public has to take place
through other means and this will vary from country to country. Non-governmental
organisations, civil society organisations, and activists have an important role to play in
spreading the ill effects of corruption, its impact on the community and society and how
the citizens themselves can play a vital role in refusing to pay bribes, to inform relevant
authorities of the incidents of bribe, and to co-operate with the media in exposing corrupt
activities. Of course the above methods will have to be tailored to suit existing local
conditions and local freedoms and this is where the local activists and NGOs have an
important role to play. There are a number of successful activist movements in
developing countries that have resulted in better forest management and irrigation
management fuelled by social justice and environment concerns. The Chipko Andolan138
(Hug a Tree Movement) and the Narmada Bachao Andolan139 (Save Narmada Valley
Movement) in India provide illustrations of how social movements can contribute to
changes. For instance, the Chipko Andolan which started in the 1970s resulted in a fifteen
year ban on green felling in the Himalayas.140
The view put forward here is of the importance of instilling an awareness of the
social impact and consequences of one’s behaviour not only in relation to oneself, the
near and the dear but on whole communities, on humanity and on generations, current
and future. Of course it could be said that this is simply an idealistic

viewpoint

underpinned by a utilitarian and humanistic philosophy of society and social relations.
Such a criticism would be unfair. What is being propounded is not unrealistic, neither is
it proposing an abstract and complex philosophical analysis of the moral and social
dimensions of human behaviour for the philosophically initiated. 141 Instead the approach
137
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here is a pragmatic one. What is being argued for is making citizens aware of the
consequences of their behaviour over the long term and their taking suitable steps to
ensure that the measures they take towards achieving the goal of individual happiness do
not cast a gloomy shadow on the happiness of the greater number. Illiteracy and lack of
formal education should by no means hinder an understanding of acting in a manner
while keeping in sight of the greater good since man has the ability to exercise selfcontrol.
Of course the importance of social awareness needs to be communicated in some
way. This is where civil society organisations have a central role to play. There is ample
evidence that civil society organisations have been successful in spreading information
and harnessing a suitable response to the social ills of the global community. TI provides
a good illustration of this. It has played a central role in exposing the incidence of
(1964) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul ) is that unique and only characteristic of mankind that commands
respect (Kant, I Lectures on Ethics (Trs. Infield, L) (1930) London: Methuen ) and is the foundation of all
human behaviour and choices it is indeed difficult to explain the high incidence of corruption that we
witness globally. Even a simplistic rational analysis of corrupt behaviour highlights its harmful effects on
society thus negating it as a rational course of action. In focusing on rationality as the distinguishing mark
of man we have overlooked, as Mary Midgley in her excellent work Beast and Man ((1980) London:
Methuen ) states, the biological basis that we share with the animal kingdom. As such, we have in common
with animals certain innate tendencies, dispositions or passions to behave in a manner that may run counter
to what rationality might dictate. If the biological basis of mankind alongside rationality is consciously fed
into our epistemic framework it is possible to explain and make sense of many instances of (irrational)
human behaviour, corruption being one of them and to seek appropriate steps to overcome some of these
natural tendencies. Of course in some cases corruption may be the best rational choice available, for
instance bribery of a customs official to enable the importation of life saving drugs in a war torn country.
While the justification may be morally acceptable and it may even be possible to make a distinction
between self-seeking corruption and corruption for altruistic purposes, whether such cases of altruistic
corruption should be legally acceptable is debatable. Maybe it is something that could be taken into
account when imposing penalties.
Ethological studies of social behaviour amongst apes (For example, Goodall J The Innocent Killers 1975,
London: Collins; Frans de Waal Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature (2005) London,
New York: Granta Books) indicate the importance and protection of kin and group amongst the primates. It
comes as no surprise therefore that man in sharing these innate tendencies is well disposed towards those
who are familiar such as members of his group, clan, race, culture and class regardless of regulations that
may discourage such behaviour in specific circumstances – for instance, anti-discrimination legislation in
an employment context. Familiarity with members of his clan or group brings with it an element of security
and trust vital for survival in the raw state in the Hobbesian sense. But humanity has progressed far
beyond this state of nature to an era of globalisation with robust interchange of cultures, ideas and peoples.
While sharing some innate tendencies with the rest of the animal kingdom, human beings are different in
that they possess rationality that can be put to good use for exercising self-control and conquering the
innate tendencies or passions that we all possess. As made apparent through linguistic behaviour, man is
self-aware and also possesses a higher level order of self-awareness in that he is aware that he is self-aware.
He also sees others as sharing these characteristics with him. As such, he has the ability to reflect on his
actions and consequences in a manner that enables him to choose, change and affect not only his course of
action but also those of others and is not tied to what his innate tendencies might dictate. It is this rational
aspect that needs to be cultivated carefully in order to combat corruption.
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corruption and has contributed to harnessing the efforts of legislators and international
institutions in combating corruption. More however needs to be done in enabling and
involving citizens, especially in the developing countries, in playing a participatory role
in not only moulding their own future but that of the global community.
6. Conclusion
Corruption is an endemic problem that affects the prosperity and well-being of nations. It
is a major contributor to poverty. Lower corruption would see a lowering of poverty
levels in the developing world since monies that would have normally found their way
into the purses of officials would be available for building a sound social and economic
infrastructure. International institutions and regional organisations have scrambled to
introduce anti-corruption conventions with the result that there are now eight conventions
varying in detail creating disharmony. The adoption and quick ratification of the
conventions by a great number of states are insufficient to curb the undesirable practice
of corruption. Some countries have ratified more than one convention and this in itself is
likely to prove cumbersome when it comes to interpreting the legislative instruments
within those states. For instance, which of the

travaux

preparatoires should the

judiciary refer to for purposes of clarification? What is needed urgently is a co-operative
and concerted effort on the part of regional and international institutions to replace the
existing regional conventions with a single comprehensive international instrument open
for ratification by all states. Instead of trying to formulate yet another convention it might
be well worth considering the UN Convention as that instrument.
Regulation however comprehensive and widely ratified and implemented

is

unlikely to prove highly successful since it is prone enforcement deficit. Corrupt
behaviour by its very nature is secretive and is likely to prove difficult to investigate. I
have suggested that we need to adopt an approach that involves members of the public in
the fight against corruption, through their refusal to willingly participate in corrupt
activities. This is achievable through instilling social awareness, through an awareness of
the harm that corruption causes to the wider community and behaving in a suitably
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responsible and balanced manner with the happiness of the greater number and current
and future generations in sight.
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